http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/Recent news, events + publications from SCPen-usPublic domainhttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/images/feed-icon-48x48.jpghttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/60http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3959Within a few short years of its founding, the Stanford China Program has established a reputation as one of the top research programs in the country focusing on contemporary China.]]>Thu, 16 May 2013 00:00:00 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3959http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3935Jean Oi was appointed to the Academic Advisory Council of the newly founded Schwarzman Scholars international scholarship program.]]>Tue, 30 Apr 2013 00:00:00 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3935http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3749Activists in Wukan, in Guangdong province, have discovered there are limits to grassroots democracy. New research by Jean C. Oi, showing a high percentage of upper-level government overseers in China's villages, highlights the boundaries of the power of local elected officials.]]>Thu, 29 Nov 2012 00:00:00 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3749http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3681Thomas Fingar, who leads the China and the World research initiative, examines the policy implications of China's view of the global order. He shares his thoughts in a new publication on security in Asia.]]>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 00:00:00 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3681http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3712Thomas Fingar, FSI’s Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow, considers how the outcome of the election could impact U.S.-China relations, and how the United States could focus its priorities in Asia.]]>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 00:00:00 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3712http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3635In a recent interview about the U.S.-China bilateral relationship, Thomas Fingar spoke of the need for the two countries to focus on building more confidence in one another for their future wellbeing.]]>Thu, 30 Aug 2012 00:00:00 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3635http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3493On May 18, 2012, the Pentagon released its annual report about the People's Republic of China's recent military developments. During Stanford's annual Oksenberg lecture, Karl Eikenberry discussed China's military modernization and its overall national security strategy.]]>Tue, 29 May 2012 00:00:00 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3493http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3474Thomas Fingar, who has observed developments in U.S.-China relations since "ping-pong diplomacy" in the early 1970s, spoke with China-based Leaders Magazine about the significance of -- and hype surrounding -- the Obama administration's "Asia pivot."]]>Thu, 10 May 2012 00:00:00 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3474http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3471A revelatory story emerged in China this spring: Bo Xilai, Chongqing’s Communist Party head, had fallen out with the party and was accused of shocking abuses of power. On May 2, the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center held a special seminar to make sense of what this unusual high-level scandal could mean for the future of China’s current political system.]]>Tue, 08 May 2012 00:00:00 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3471http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3463Chinese officials are developing a social security network to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing demographic landscape. Karen Eggleston discusses the success of China’s health care reforms and the long road ahead.]]>Wed, 02 May 2012 00:00:00 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/news/3463http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23844National Bureau of Asian Research, October 2012
This chapter by Thomas Fingar examines three sets of factors that shape Chinese thinking and actions with respect to world order and examines the possible contours and implications of the order China may seek.]]>Fri, 24 May 2013 09:44:12 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23844http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23585Survival: Global Politics and Strategy vol. 54, Jan. 31, 2012
Aaron Friedberg’s thoughtful and thought-provoking A Contest for Supremacy does many things well, but what it does best is to underscore the uncertainties and contingencies that must be factored into any analysis of China’s rise and its implications for the United States and other nations.]]>Fri, 03 Feb 2012 10:52:09 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23585http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23551Modern China, September 2011
Focusing on the episodes of the government’s Paved Road to Every Village (PREV) project in an agricultural township in northern China, this article examines two research issues: First, the role of state policies, government bureaucracies, and village cadres in the provision of public goods, especially the unintended consequences that led to huge collective debts and the erosion of the collective basis of governance and second, the role of local institutions and social relations in resource mobilization, problem solving, and response to crises, especially in the aftermath of the PREV project.]]>Thu, 19 Jan 2012 12:04:07 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23551http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23550The China Quarterly vol. 208, December 2011
Based on ethnographic research on the autumn harvest in a township in northern China, this study sheds light on distinctive modes of market transactions across produces, and diverse interactions between markets and local institutions involving different co-ordination mechanisms, rhythms and social relationships.]]>Thu, 19 Jan 2012 11:57:02 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23550http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23549Chinese Sociological Review vol. 44, No. 1, Fall 2011
The prevailing image in the economic and legal literature portrays property rights as “a bundle of rights” and emphasizes their exclusivity, autonomy, and stability. Building on Zhou (2005), the authors elaborate and illustrate an alternative theoretical model to conceptualize property rights as a relational concept.]]>Thu, 19 Jan 2012 11:46:29 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23549http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23268Journal of Asian Studies vol. 70, May 2011
China's protracted regional conflicts of 1967 and 1968 have long been understood as struggles between conservative and radical forces whose opposed interests were so deeply rooted in existing patterns of power and privilege that they defied the imposition of military control. This study of Nanjing, a key provincial capital that experienced prolonged factional conflict, yields a new explanation: the conflicts were prolonged precisely because they could not be characterized as pitting "conservatives" against "radicals," making it difficult for central officials, local military forces, or Mao Zedong to decide how to resolve them. Furthermore, Beijing officials, regional military forces, and local civilian cadres were themselves divided against one another, exacerbating and prolonging local conflicts. In competing for approval from central authorities, local factions adopted opportunistic and rapidly shifting political stances designed to portray their opponents as reactionary conservatives -- charges that had no basis in fact.]]>Fri, 16 Dec 2011 14:01:18 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23268http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23267Management and Organization Review vol. 7, March 2011
Over the past decade, the ownership and control of China's corporate sector has finally begun to depart fundamentally from patterns typical in the socialist past. Students of corporate governance have watched these changes with an intense curiosity about their impact on firm performance. Students of comparative economic institutions have examined them for hints of a new variety of Asian capitalism and have sought to anticipate China's international competitiveness and impact. But these changes potentially will create a new corporate elite with greater compensation, personal wealth, and independence from government agencies than ever before. This transformation of China's political economy may eventually alter the Chinese state itself, although the extent and nature of this change are still far from clear. The key questions of interest are the social origins of the new elite, the scale of the economic assets they control, and especially their continuing relationships with party and government agencies. The answers will vary decisively by sector, four of which are described here: a state-owned sector, a privatized sector, a transactional sector, and an entrepreneurial sector. The evolving mix of these sectors will determine the future contours of the Chinese corporate economy.]]>Fri, 16 Dec 2011 14:01:10 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23267http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23266Journal of Comparative Economics vol. 30, June 2002
In the second decade of market reform, rural cadre and entrepreneur households enjoy large net income advantages of roughly equal magnitude. Cadre household incomes are primarily from salaries, and they do not decline with increasing levels of rural industrialization. These cross-sectional findings about income determination are reinforced by an event-history analysis of occupational shifts. With large income advantages based on salary income, at no point in market reform have cadres moved into self-employment or private entrepreneurship at higher rates than ordinary farmers. However, village cadres have become the most important source of collective enterprise managers and collective enterprise managers in turn have become the most important source of new private entrepreneurs. Therefore the thriving collective enterprise sector of the 1980's has served as a breeding ground for private enterprise in the 1990's.]]>Fri, 16 Dec 2011 13:41:09 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23266http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23265The China Journal vol. 65, January 2011
Mass factions in China during the first two years of the Cultural Revolution have long been understood as interest groups: collections of individuals who shared interests due to common occupations, statuses, or party affiliations. An alternative view, developed primarily with evidence about the distinctive case of Beijing students, emphasizes not the characteristics of participants but histories of political encounters in collapsing bureaucratic hierarchies.]]>Fri, 16 Dec 2011 14:01:03 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23265http://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23238Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, in One Step Back? Reassessing an Ideal Security State for Asia 2025, 2011
In the chapter "Alternate Trajectories of the Roles and Influence of China and the United States in Northeast Asia and the Implications for Future Power Configurations" (One Step Back? Reassessing an Ideal Security State for Asia 2025, 2011). Fingar examines several key factors and interactions between countries that he predicts are likely to configure the security structure of Northeast Asia between now and 2025.]]>Fri, 16 Dec 2011 13:13:25 PSThttp://chinaprogram.stanford.edu/publications/23238